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Abstract 
In this paper we use developments in the history of 
science to demonstrate the significance of 
experimental cultures and epistemic spaces within 
artistic research as an experimental system. We 
propose that ‘artistic products’ are process artefacts, 
which are of epistemic nature (epistemic-aesthetic 
things). We suggest that artistic research provides a 
unique opportunity to integrate diverse epistemic 
practices that currently exist outside traditional 
institutional frameworks to develop new 
hypotheses-generating experimental cultures.  
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Artistic practice relishes its amor-
phous existence. It has been possessed 
with an avant-garde mentality of being 
beyond boundaries. Attempts to install 
boundaries have often been met with 
fierce resistance, and it is feared that the 
reconfiguration of artistic practice as a 
type of research is such an attempt. This 
can largely be reduced to a misunder-
standing on the artist's behalf of what 
constitutes research, and more signifi-
cantly, a misconception of the scientist, 
who is commonly regarded as the quin-
tessential researcher, as an oppositional 
archetype to the artist. The argument that 
scientists discover what already exists, 
while artists create what does not exist, 
is built on a bastardized Cartesian dual-
ism that positions culture as independent 
from nature. Culture is produced by bio-
logical organisms, and is manifested 
within the physical realm from things 
that already exist. Sounds engineered 
within a musical composition are not 
metaphysical incarnations conjured by 
an artist alchemist who is possessed of a 
creative spirit gifted by some omnipotent 
being. The arrangement of these sounds 
is indebted to an accumulated history of 
technological experimentation, a millen-
nia of manipulation of the world, from 
the vibrating flesh in our throats to the 
tonal variations of differing air pockets 
in sea shells. The musical systems that 
have emerged over time, such as the 
standardised twelve-tone equal temper-
ament, are language systems that have 
been developed and tampered with to 
describe the world, by the world. The 
data sets, theorems, vowels and nouns 
featured in the bound, shredded sheets of 
trees that are described as scientific pa-
pers are not so dissimilar from the musi-
cal manuscripts of Mozart.  
There is the parable of the theoretical 
physicist Heisenberg sitting at the piano 
and playing Beethoven's last sonata, 
Opus 111, for some peers. After the 
performance he reportedly said, “If I had 
never lived, someone else would 
probably have formulated the principle 
of determinacy. If Beethoven had never 
lived, no one would have written Opus 
111” [1]. However, by extending Donald 
Brook’s concept of “art as memetic 
innovation” [2] we can understand that 
had Beethoven not lived, Opus 111 in its 
exact form may never have existed, yet 
something very much like it would have 
been produced. Beethoven was not born 
in a vacuum, but inhabited a cultural 
moment, and his musical compositions 
were an extension of the accumulated 
cultural and technological knowledge 
that had preceded him. It is interesting to 
note that Heisenberg, when questioned 
over the accuracy of the account, replied 
that he could not remember if it was 
Opus 111 that he had played on that 
particular occasion [3]. Another unborn 
composer and another unwritten sonata 
could have substituted; the sacred aura 
instilled around Opus 111 is irrelevant.  
The myth of the artistic genius 
wandering alone beyond boundaries 
hinders the possibility of recognising 
artistic practice as a form of research, 
favouring the artist as Caspar David 
Friedrich's Wanderer above the Sea of 
Fog (Fig. 1) over Isaac Newton's “dwarf 
standing on the shoulders of giants” [4]. 
However, although the scientist and the 
artist inhabit separate epistemological 
communities and produce different kinds 
of knowledge, they are both researchers.  
 
Artistic Things and Scientific 
Things 
Fig. 1. Caspar David Friedrich, The Wanderer above the Sea of Fog, 1818, oil on canvas 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s description 
of the sciences as a "permanent process 
of reorientation and reshuffling of the 
boundaries of what is thought to be 
known and what is beyond imagination" 
[5] could equally be applied to artistic 
practice. This “process” can be more 
suitably used to describe what research 
is rather than what the sciences do. It is 
this miscalculation of what scientists do 
and what artists do that problematises the 
configuration of artistic practice as 
research. The ideas that ‘artists create 
things’ and ‘scientists discover things’ 
are not mutually exclusive; scientists 
must also create to discover. As 
Rheinberger has described, scientific 
things “are not simply hidden things to 
be brought to light through sophisticated 
manipulations” [6]. 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger also outlines 
the similarity between ‘scientific things’ 
(‘Wissenschaftsdinge’) and ‘artistic 
things’ (‘Kunstdinge’) by observing the 
“processual character of their coming 
into being”, and their “similar innovative 
moments” [7]. After the practice turn or 
processual turn, not only did scientific 
research change, but with it experimental 
art practices. Scientific practice became 
performative, even playful, if we look at 
descriptions of historical epistemology. 
Falko Schmieder sees a parallel with the 
new avant-gardes of the twentieth 
century, which can be described as 
‘experimental cultures’ [8]. 
The emerging crisis of reflection on 
scientific knowledge within the natural 
sciences, particularly in the field of 
physics, began in the beginning of the 
twentieth century with the development 
of quantum science and Albert Einstein’s 
theory of relativity [9]. The two critical 
thinkers discussed by Rheinberger are 
Ludwik Fleck and Gaston Bachelard. 
Both were “outsiders in the eyes of their 
contemporaries, belonging to no definite 
tradition” [10], and were postulating the 
experimental and technical character of 
modern science, as well as its social 
character. 
Historical epistemology (exemplified 
by the writings of Gaston Bachelard and 
Georges Canguilhem, among others) 
reconfigured the development of 
scientific thought through various social 
and material preconditions that were 
historically determined, significantly 
shaping the way (scientific) research was 
undertaken and understood. Ludwik 
Fleck acknowledged this shift in 
thinking with the term ‘experiment’: 
“every experimental researcher knows 
how little a single experiment proves and 
enforces. There is always the need of a 
system of experiments ...” [11]. He goes 
on to argue that if an experiment were 
clear from the beginning, there would be 
no purpose in undertaking it. In the 
1970s, Rheinberger pursued Fleck’s 
ideas extensively to demonstrate that 
“Experimental systems ... are systems of 
manipulation designed to give unknown 
answers to questions which themselves 
we are not yet able clearly to ask” [12]. 
Experimental Systems in Artistic 
Research 
Rheinberger described the ‘experimental 
system’ as "a basic unit of experimental 
activity combining local, technical, 
instrumental, institutional, social, and 
epistemic aspects" [13]. By looking at 
the research practices of (experimental) 
natural sciences in the laboratory, he 
suggested that the idea of the experiment 
as validating/invalidating clearly defined 
hypotheses is plainly wrong (also 
referring to Fleck). The actual process of 
research is much more chaotic and 
unplanned than communicated, with 
linearity and stringency mostly 
constructed afterwards. 
Henk Borgdorff, in his discussion of 
Rheinberger’s experimental systems in 
artistic research, poses the question of 
the epistemological status of art 
practices. He asks if “artworks are 
capable of creating, articulating, 
embodying knowledge and 
understanding”, and further “if so, what 
kind of artworks and practices do this?” 
[14] If we accept artistic research as 
experimental community, any artistic 
output could be understood as ‘process 
artefacts’ [15], which are in this context 
epistemic things (hypotheses) generated 
out of the larger context of the 
experimental system. Borgdorff has 
previously demonstrated that 
“researchers employ experimental and 
hermeneutical methods that reveal and 
articulate the tacit knowledge that is 
situated and embodied in specific 
artworks and artistic processes.” [16] Yet 
beyond these processes and products, we 
need to also recognise and understand 
the social character of artistic research, 
and of the artistic/academic communities 
in which a specific output is created and 
placed, in ‘thought collectives’ and 
‘thought styles’ as Ludwik Fleck 
described [17]. In this context, we have 
to not only think of the process of 
knowledge generation in the lab/artist’s 
studio, but to extend the viewpoint from 
experimental systems to experimental 
cultures and epistemic spaces. 
The role of technology in 
research practice 
Gaston Bachelard demanded that we 
look more closely at what happens in the 
laboratory, since not every scientific 
practice can be seen as the same. He 
challenged philosophers of science to 
“familiarize themselves with the 
laboratories and workshops of science, 
and especially with the history of science 
as the epistemological laboratory par 
excellence” [9]. Historical epistemology 
emerged from Bachelard’s concept of 
‘realization’ – ‘technological realism’ 
through which the constitution of 
modern scientific thought is mediated by 
instruments. 
Thomas Kuhn was "favoring concept-
driven research as a paradigm over tool-
driven research" [18], but is "non-tool 
driven research" even possible in the 
current technology-driven society? 
‘Phenomenotechnique’ (the term was 
coined by Gaston Bachelard to describe 
the relationship between scientific 
thinking and technology in modern 
science) is integral to the understanding 
of not only the concept of historical 
epistemology [19], but also how 
technology shapes our way of thinking, 
and how we generate new knowledge. 
Rheinberger focuses on the “material, 
instruments, arrangements ...” that are to 
be considered when thinking about 
the  “uncertainty principle of aesthetic 
things” [20]. What he describes as the 
process of “tapping in the dark” 
(tâtonnement) is determined by the 
technology (or technique) used, where 
“the new comes into being” [20]. 
According to Bachelard’s 
‘phenomenotechnique’ – in which 
instruments are to be understood as 
materialised theories, products of 
technique [21] - "The electric bulb is an 
object of scientific thought … an 
example of an abstract-concrete object." 
[22] 
Simon Werrett, in his essay ‘The 
Techniques of Innovation’, suggested 
that “art, invention, experiment, media or 
technology have always been related ... 
dependent on local, historical 
circumstances” [23]. By constituting that 
“there is nothing inherent in actions to 
designate them as artistic or scientific” 
he indicates that the “process of social 
negotiation, in which techniques emerge, 
stabilise and then endure as media, art or 
experiments”, but still “always remain 
open to change and reinterpretation, or 
reinsertion into novel arenas” [23].  He 
states that these experiments in art and 
technology “have been ongoing since the 
Renaissance, though much of the map of 
their various forms and relations remain 
to be explored” [23]. 
Ludwik Fleck acknowledges that 
“patterns of knowledge are patterns of 
culture” [24]. Epistemic things generated 
within experiments in art and technology 
will intrinsically cause patterns 
of knowledge to develop, and therefore 
patterns of culture. This can be observed 
within media art practices, where 
auxiliary ‘thought collectives’ emerge 
around those who work with and develop 
specific tools and techniques. Artistic 
research as experimental culture has the 
unique capacity of an ‘antidiscipline 
discipline’ to foster and integrate these 
‘thought collectives’ with their special 
‘styles of thought’. 
Experimental Cultures and 
Epistemic Spaces 
As Simon Penny has noted, the 
emergence of these technological 
cultural forms always involves diverse 
communities of toolmakers, and their 
“particular contributions and motivations 
are seldom noted, except in specialised 
studies” [25], [26]. Often such cultures, 
are, as Penny calls them, ‘renegades’ or 
‘eccentrics’, producing their tools 
outside of institutions. They are creators 
of “visionary technologies”, that are “by 
definition, ahead of the technological-
industrial curve” [25]. One of the aims of 
our project Artistic Technology Research 
is to insert these production cultures into 
the domain of institutions of art and 
higher education, whilst also displaying 
their efforts in the context of 
contemporary research and artistic 
production. The initiative Coded 
Cultures [27], while reflecting on critical 
potential in diverse (technological / 
artistic) subcultures [28], also examined 
what the intersections of contemporary 
art, technology, media and research 
could bring to the domain of ‘artistic 
research’ and other transdisciplinary 
practices. This initiative was initially 
intended as a festival including hacker-, 
maker- and artistic contexts. 
The framework of artistic research not 
only offers artists the opportunity to “ex-
plore areas of reality and knowledge they 
weren’t necessarily ‘entitled’ to explore” 
[29], but fosters the ability to question 
methods and ‘usual’ processes of 
knowledge generation. We are asking for 
a strong interdisciplinary practice, which 
various academic and artistic fields 
could participate in and benefit from. 
Artistic research understood as experi-
mental culture needs to take into account 
the design of experimental systems, 
which can only be successful if they 
offer “epistemic things enough room to 
evolve” [30]. Extending this thought, 
epistemic spaces such as project configu-
rations [31] that are not only present in 
laboratories, but also in distributed loca-
tions (see the concept of ‘macro-
epistemics’ [32]), are to be kept vivid 
and active. By exploring these experi-
mental cultures and epistemic spaces, 
artistic research promises to incorporate 
the avant-garde mentality that has histor-
ically been associated with artistic prac-
tice, and to continue to challenge both 
the perceived boundaries of knowledge 
and the imagination.  
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